After decades of a rather marginal existence and little coherence in its development, lifecourse research is definitely coming of age. There are, however, recent signs of consolidation and first attempts at reaping the scattered harvest of research in various disciplines, especially in the form of a first handbook of life-course research (Mortimer & Shanahan, 2003) , of first attempts at interdisciplinary dialogue around specific approaches such as Baltes' life-span psychology 2 (Staudinger & Lindenberger, 2003) and of a specialized annual review (in which this volume is published). Nevertheless, life-course scholars still seem to be a small handful « digging » on the fringe of their disciplinary mainstreams, as yet with little influence on more established fields of research. Why are we, i.e., life course researchers, so keen on life courses? What is there so special about life-course research? We feel in fact that are a number of specific challenges life-course researchers have to confront and to answer.
1 The Pavie Team, as it existed when the interdisciplinary venture that produced this volume was launched, comprised a founding group of six professors and eight researchers and research assistants. They all participated in the elaboration of a working document that was the basis of an international colloquium held in october 2003 and that has been largely integrated into this introduction. In order to underscore the team character of this work, we list their names in strict alphabetical order: Jean-Claude Deschamps, Guy Elcheroth, Yannic Forney, JacquesAntoine Gauthier, Paolo Ghisletta, Jean Kellerhals, Christian Lalive d'Epinay, Jean-Marie Le Goff, René Levy, Anik de Ribaupierre, Claudine Sauvain-Dugerdil, Dario Spini, Manuel Tettamanti, Eric Widmer. 2 Coming from two -at times -different scientific traditions, the terms life course and life span share so much meaning at many levels (conceptual and methodological) that we can safely focus on the similarities between the two terms and consider them as basically synonymous. Instead of using them interchangeably, we rather settle on the use of life course for the sake of simplicity (for a discussion of these two terms, along with the less adequate one of life cycle, see Settersten, 2003a who takes the same terminological stand as we do).
-gender differences or more generally the social relationships between the sexes, 5 but also a number of other cases of strong social differentiation of both a cultural and a structural kind that have strong incidences on the level of individual identities (like ethnic or religious group membership etc.), that are often leveled out by static analyses or even ignored by gender-blind or more generally « differentiation-blind » theoretical models, 6 -linked lives, the strong interdependencies between the life courses of related persons that remind us that the real object of most of the social sciences are relations between actors and not just monadic individuals as some current mainstream paradigms would have it.
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If we are to bridge successfully all these gaps, with their thematical, conceptual and methodological implications, one may object that we have to become scientific geniuses. As social scientists we know that individual mastery is not all, that groups are frequently wiser than the « addition » of their individual members, so team-work is certainly a way out of this problem.
Working integratively in the sense just mentioned calls for team work.
Among the gaps that work on life courses intrinsically needs to bridge figures also the one between scientific disciplines, above all in the social sciences (including, of course, psychology). The arguments for interdisciplinarity in this area may not be fundamentally different from those applying to other themes -as soon as we get interested in a real world problem and not only an epistemological slice of it, we can not be satisfied by adopting one disciplinary perspective only. Most often, interdisciplinarity is claimed for problem-oriented or « applied » research. If the research objective is to resolve a problem, disciplinary purity and coherence is of no interest, we mobilize all promising resources whatever their disciplinary origin and theoretical ramifications. This may not be the primary orientation of life-course research. But there is another important and sufficient motive for interdisciplinarity in this area that we have already encountered: the holist perspective on individuals and their development in social context which cannot be contented by any single aspect alone, be it sectoral 5 This is an uneasy translation of the standard French expression « rapports sociaux de sexe ». 6 It goes without saying that a similar argument could be made for all classical sociological variables supposed to capture some aspect of social differentiation, first of all « class » or position in social hiearchies, but several of these are socially less « thick ». We do, of course, not mean to relegate them to a secondary position for analysis, but rather feel that in current research, there is a danger of too exclusive a concentration on them. 7 The most general paradigm of this sort in sociology is rational choice theory or « methodological individualism ». But there are many more specialized areas where predominant approaches at least implicitely adopt an individualist stance, for instance in the form of the status attainment paradigm in mobility research. In psychology, the same problem exists but in a more fundamental sense, considerations of « contextuality » being more intrinsically out of theoretical bounds than, say, in sociology, social psychology or political science (but see Bronfenbrenner's ecological model, 1979 , Baltes' contextualism, Baltes, Lindenberger & Staudinger, 1998 , or even Erikson's epigenetic model, 1950 .
8 There are some special research fields where interdisciplinary is already practised in a more or less regular way, such as gerontoloy. But even here, collaboration is often more of a coordinated parallelism than real cooperation. Moreover, in this case, research is not systematically placed in a full life-course framework. 9 Some authors suggest that the vocabulary of truly transdisciplinary analysis should be based outside the boundaries of scientific terminology. This may be useful in highly problem-oriented research, but should not be seen as a general rule. Systems theory provides a scientific vocabulary for transdisciplinary conceptualization that is, to the least, no less promising than everyday or other non-scientific language.
There is a huge gap between the almost unisonous choir of public voices asking for interdisciplinarity, and scientific everyday practice which is needed to discover the real difficulties of such an endeavor to begin with. A realistic approach must probably start from the principle that with a view to interdisciplinary convergence or at least cooperation, differences should not be silenced, but discussed and integrated. Well-placed protagonists assure us that this is no easy business -witness, as one example, Mayer (2002) who coolly states on the encounter of life-course sociology and life-span psychology (in which he has been engaged himself) :
« In retrospect, despite all the strong mutual recognition and reinforcement, surprisingly little convergence and integration has actually occurred. ». There is definitely still some way to make; the present volume is meant to bring us a step ahead on this way.
Difficulties of interdisciplinarity
As long as not many social scientists have themselves a really interdisciplinary education and working profile, interdisciplinary work is bound to be teamwork. Along with more current organizational questions, interdisciplinary teams have to confront quite real problems in their everyday functioning, even if these may often seem somewhat trivial when looked at from a theoretical vantage point. These practical difficulties need to be taken seriously in order to overcome them. Let us briefly look into some of them. But an assured rootedness in their own disciplines of scholars working together in an interdisciplinary team is most probably a precondition for successful interdisciplinarity, even though this may appear as a paradox.
A first kind of difficulties to be clarified and surpassed on the way to interdisciplinary teamwork is in the area of vocabulary. Our disciplines use some identical terms with quite different meanings (e.g., « norm » has an entirely cultural, obligational ring in sociology, but the objectivist meaning of statistical prevalence -or even biological « normality » -in developmental psychology ; or the different semantic extension of the notion of « micro » and « macro » between the same two disciplines). The other way round, we use sometimes different terms for the same things (e.g. in the methodological area). One example seems to pose little problem: the more sociological or demographical term of life course seems to overlap very largely with the more psychological one of life span. We therefore consider them in this chapter as synonyms. Another, probably minor, example are different names used in different disciplines for the same methods (e.g., survival analysis, event history analysis, or, in French, designate the same or at least highly similar analytical methods; the same is true for multilevel models -random effect models -mixed effect models and also hierarchical models).
Other differences, that cannot be ruled out by mere lexical agreements, are related to the typical frames of attention of the disciplines. Mainstream (or traditional) developmental psychology focuses largely on very early (and, to a lesser extent, very old) years of life while the bulk of sociological work concerns the adult years (mostly without spelling out explicitly this horizon). At first sight, social psychology does not seem to be very specific in this respect; in fact, it shows only rarely an outspoken awareness of and interest in processes of growing older or in the life course. But there is a hidden and rarely acknowledged specificity inherent in much research in this discipline: a large fraction of empirical research in social psychology, at least about attitudes and representations, is done with the most accessible category of experimental subjects, i.e., with students, who represent quite a specific age group as well as a set of rather specific locations in social stratification. Little is known about the impact of this double background specificity on the results and scientific knowledge in this discipline. Two transitions have attracted the attention of social demographers, the first from adolescence to adulthood and the second the end of life (mortality).
There are, of course, many conceptual differences that may constitute as many difficulties for mutual understanding and cooperation. Let us only mention one example: the weight that different social science disciplines usually attribute to biology vs. environment (or nature vs.
nurture in a more traditional formulation). While psychology has largely put aside earlier apprehensions with respect to close contact with biology, sociology and even more political sciences or social and cultural anthropology have up to now maintained a greater distance ; demography is hard to locate on this dimension, but would certainly have little hesitations to be situated near psychology, and potentially event could stretch its interests as far as to reach not only psychology or sociology, but also biology in the sense that it is currently interested in biologically structured events like birth and death. This basic opposition has a close relative in the difference between internal and external explanations of the « socialization vs. institutional channeling » variety (e.g., concerning the probable impact of age-normative conceptions vs. context or environmental conditions). Confronted to such differences in basic assumptions that characterize the often implicit scientific cultures of different disciplines, interdisciplinary collaboration needs above all the renouncement of rigorous a priori stands and a pragmatic curiosity for the other disciplines' way of looking at things. Another important and potentially dividing difference concerns the distinction between factual and representational aspects that may be highlighted by the far-reaching attachment to statistical description by demography on the hand and the heavy emphasis of most of social psychology on individual and collective representations, on the other. If we push this line of thinking further, there are of course situations where it may become very difficult to find common ground between disciplines, like psychology and demography, because they are normally interested in too different topicsbut then, we are also leaving the array where interdisciplinarity really makes sense.
Pathways to interdisciplinarity
Beyond such unavoidable practical questions and their solutions, whose importance must not be underestimated, we must also think about more theoretically grounded pathways to real interdisciplinarity. In this section, we wish to propose three such routes for practical exploration: direct theoretical linkages between concepts of different disciplines, identification of formal characteristics of life courses that may acquire similar meanings for different disciplines, and specific substantial themes that may link different disciplinary outlooks due to their transversal relevance. Our presentation will necessarily remain abstract, with only limited illustrations, as our aim cannot go beyond sketching some promising directions; their exploration is yet to come, but hopefully, this outline can provoke some fruitful discussions that help us progress in this sense. We feel moreover that systematic scrutiny of the extant literature would produce a wealth of examples that have already arisen out of research practice. Our proposal is probably little more than a possible systematization of thoughts already present in our field.
Theoretical linkages
A first possible pathway to the construction of interdisciplinarity in life-course research consists of creating theoretical linkages between concepts of different disciplines. If this is not an explicit part of our everyday practice when doing research, it is often implicitly present. If we take the example of the relationship between sociology and social psychology, we may say that many -perhaps all -sociological hypotheses located on the micro-interactional level and concerning behavior of individuals and groups are based on implicit assumptions of social-psychological mechanisms relating the (sociological) concepts used. The most trivial such mechanism is some kind of social rationality, be it along the lines of rational choice theory or according to more complex paradigms. Less trivial examples are social comparison, social learning, the pursuit of social recognition, reciprocity, and advantage, or conformity to social norms. Another, quite different mechanism of that kind would be the one operating the transformation of internal into external attribution in the course of social interactions leading the implied actors to realize that each of them is not alone to experience a given problem but that there is a social category of people with whom they share the problem in question (classical example : the formation of the labor movement, and social movements more generally), and the personally « alleviating » consequence of such processes of collectivization of subjectively felt problems. Many hypotheses about social behavior, e.g., concerning biographical decisions with a view to social mobility, currently assume the functioning of such mechanisms without normally making them explicit, even less testing them. Similar relationships may exist or be developed between other disciplines.
A slightly different example is the formulation of direct interdisciplinary hypotheses, i.e., hypotheses linking dimensions « belonging » to different disciplines. Stating more explicitly Baltes' (1987 Baltes' ( , 1997 thesis of contextuality in psychological development directly leads to such hypotheses, for instance in postulating how structural locations of individuals (in the larger social structure, in their family, in one of their peer groups) explain elements of their identity formation, ways of psychological or interactional styles, etc.
Formal aspects of life courses: trajectories, stages, transitions and events
We know from research that life-course transitions (such as entering or leaving school, entering professional life or parenthood, marriage, divorce, retirement, moving into nursing homes in old age) have a great significance for individual identities and for the connection between people and institutions. The stages and transitions of life courses are significant in terms of cognitive abilities, representations of the self, relations with significant others and with the institutional and the societal order. Four current concepts are directly related to any processual perspective on the life course: trajectory, stage, transition and event; they are central for the understanding of human action, relatively common to various disciplines, and may therefore constitute another inroad to facilitating the construction of interdisciplinary cooperation.
Trajectory
The meaning of trajectory can be defined as "model of stability and long-term changes" (George, 1993) or "sequence of profiles of insertion" (Levy, 2001) . In this sense, the notion of trajectory is mainly used to describe the movements or developments occurring during the whole span of life, i.e., all that takes place between the two ultimate life boundaries -or, in our context, transitions -that are birth and death. If this explication remains especially close to sociological use, one finds a similar one in social psychology where trajectories are conceived of as all the movements of an individual in the social space (see among others Viaud, 1999: 80) and in social demography with the notion of biography (Courgeau & Lelièvre, 1989: 56) . Baltes and Schaie (1976) discuss cohort effects on cognitive performance. Such differences were often confounded with age effects. These results justify the distinction of typical trajectories that correlate strongly with institutional influences and societal transformations while these may in turn affect cognitive performance. Baltes (1987) discussed the relative regularity of processes of change during the first ages of life. Baltes interpreted these results by stating that the social fabric is more solid, substantial and homogeneous during childhood than during adulthood, the latter showing less regularity due to a greater variability of situational factors.
Moreover, one could add that the more relevant influences of biological nature during childhood (maturation etc.) imply more regularity of that section of the developmental trajectory.
The shift to a social-psychological and sociological perspective on this question happens in the first place by considering the principle of "linked lives" formulated by Elder (1974) : trajectories of the individual members of the same primary group (family, friends, workmates) are interdependent. For instance and in principle, it is necessary to take into account the trajectory of the father and the mother of any individual to understand the logic underlying his or her trajectory. In sociological research, this principle is widely applied, notably in research on strategies of social mobility, socialization, domestic functioning, etc. The same principle could bring important results in interdisciplinary research.
In order to build a more complete model, it is advisable to add institutional, historical and geographical dimensions (Kohli, 1985; Elder, 1985; Mayer & Schoepflin, 1989; Heinz, 1992) to these individual and relational factors. Ideally, the ambition of such a global model would be to capture and interpret the interdependences between these various developmental dynamics. In practice, however, one often prefers to distinguish specific trajectories (marital, professional, health-related, residential) within the global trajectory. 12 This raises two important questions: on the one hand we need to know how to take account of the mutual influences between these particular trajectories instead of studying them separately. On the other hand, is it after all possible and/or desirable to merge the separate trajectories into a unique global trajectory?
In the perspective of modeling multidimensional trajectories, Abbott (e.g. Abbott, 1992) , a historian and sociologist working on both the empirical and theoretical level of trajectories, proposes a "narrative" approach where the notion of narration is substituted to that of causality. According to Abbott one of the major problems of research concerning trajectories lies in the fact that one is mostly confronted with a variety of sequences of events occurring at different speeds. These multiple temporal horizons constitute a theoretical barrier that prevents researchers from raising formalized stories beyond the "simplistic" analyses of stage process (stories which develop relatively independently) and sequences of rational actions. The possibility of matching sequences of events occurring at various speeds might prove very useful for life-course research. (Kruglanski, 1996) and "testing the limits" (Baltes, Lindenberger & Staudinger, 1998) . Neostructuralists have maintained certain Piagetian principles and added the following modifications: (1) the redefinition of cognitive structures (other structures than Piaget's "logico-mathematical" ones), not necessarily seen as universal; moreover, cultural and linguistic factors are also considered; (2) a stage is now defined by an upper cognitive limit, rather than by certain behaviors in different situations; the upper limit moves during ontogenesis, hence, maturation and aging are of chief importance; (3) individual differences and characteristic patterns of individual development are considered; (4) it is assumed that affective and social development are similar to cognitive development. Moreover, the notion of stage has been extended and applied to adult life (Labouvie-Vief, 1980 Edelstein & Noam, 1982; Pascual-Leone, 1983; Riegel, 1976 ; but see already Erikson, 1950) .
In social psychology the concept of stage is used to refer to bases of retrospective biographical memories (McAdams, 1993 (McAdams, , 1999 . However, in many applications of research, the Pia-13 In most disciplines, the concept of stage, even if conceived as an element of a continuous process, is not inherently linked to notions of finality and universality although these notions have often been intimately associated with the definition of stage. This misconception has been strongly criticized, especially by anthropologists.An important example of such a debate about implicit and scientifically unfounded directionality assumptions on a supraindividual level has concerned modernization theory.
getian conception of stage has been maintained. Moral development, as conceived by Kohlberg and his followers (Turiel, 1983; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988) , has kept the universal deterministic flavor. However, this conception has been criticized for theoretical and methodological reasons (Emler, 1999; Tostain, 1999) .
In social demography, the concepts of episode or phase are usually used to refer to welldefined life periods (e.g., employment phases and phases of professional inactivity for women). Sometimes, the term of age is used to designate a broader phase of the life course (e.g., adult age). 14 However, the application of the term of stage in a sense close to the Piagetian tradition seems to be recent (De Bruijn, 1999) ; its universalistic and deterministic features are mostly avoided. Instead, emphasis is put on human agency. Furthermore, the deterministic feature of a stage is opposed to the stochastic character attached to events.
In sociology, the concept of stage refers to a stable state of various duration. The social constraints and normative expectations typical of each stage are generally emphasized. Historically, in a macro-sociological perspective, models directly relying on the conception of stage (Comte, Marx, Spencer, Parsons) have been strongly criticized because of their evolutionist, linear and deterministic features. In a micro-sociological perspective, the notion of stage has been applied to the description of family development and, of course, to individual life courses where it is sometimes used to designate age-groups (e.g., adolescents, middle-aged etc.), sometimes also categories defined by a specific institutional participation (like preschoolers, employed, retired, etc.). Close terms such as period are often used to avoid the restrictions of the more assumption-loaded term of stage.
Transition
Across disciplines, the concept of transition refers to the idea of change: change from one state or situation to another, from one life period to another, from one status or role to another. Defining a phenomenon as transitional can not be done in an absolute way since by definition, a transition relates a state "before" to a state "after". The use of the term depends on the extension and on the specific processes implied by the transition and may sometimes be a specific way at looking at an object rather than this object's inherent characteristic. For instance, adolescence can either be qualified as a transitional stage, in particular in a perspective of development from childhood to late adulthood (Durkin, 1995) , or as a life stage in itself, with its own developmental tasks, at the end of which the transition to adulthood takes place (Erikson, 1950 ).
Three related concepts, each referring to a particular kind of transition, are: (1) "revolution" (Mounoud, 1982) , which refers to a discrete transition, to the emergence of a new "structure d'ensemble" and thus does not apply to the acquisition of a new isolated capacity; (2) "turning point" (Gotlib & Wheaton, 1997), which refers to a transition (or perhaps more frequently to an event) that implies a change in the orientation of a trajectory and not just a mere confirmation of this trajectory by a transition that fits into a general pattern; (3) "social mobility", upward, downward or horizontal, which is only related to transitions that affect the social status of a person, mostly implying an increase or a reduction of his economic, social or cultural capital (in the case of vertical mobility).
A number of theorists have attempted to apply to the study of individual transitions the mathematical "catastrophe theory" (Thom, 1975) and the concept of "bifurcation" (e.g., van der tative with qualitative changes. For instance, a series of small quantitative changes can eventually lead to an abrupt transition, resulting in what proves to be qualitatively very different from the preceding periods.
Although commonalities of the concept of transition exist across disciplines, each discipline differentiates its approaches to and uses of the notion of transitions. Social demography and sociology share a focus on the study of the effects of various parameters -sociodemographical (e.g., fertility, life expectancies, migration, social and geographical mobility) or institutional (compulsory school, labor market, retirement system, etc.) on the occurrence, timing and variability of transitions (Hogan, 1981; Rindfuss, Swicegood, & Rosenfeld, 1987; Settersten & Mayer, 1997) . In social psychology, the same transitions are most often conceived of as independent variables whose effects are studied (e.g., in studies interested in the effects of particular transitions on social representations, Viaud, 1999, and self-concept, Hagestad & Neugarten, 1985; Havighurst, 1972; Kling, Ryff, & Essex, 1997) . Developmental cognitive psychologists are more interested in explaining the mechanisms and explanatory factors of transitions characterizing the individual cognitive development (de Ribaupierre, 1989) . In a Piagetian perspective, these mechanisms are described as depending on processes of maturation, cognitive conflict, equilibration and the interaction with the social environment. Here, transitions are usually conceived as dependent variables and at a more microscopic level than in sociology or social demography.
The idiosyncrasies of the various disciplines have not hindered interdisciplinary work. For instance, some researchers in social psychology are interested in life choice orientations (which directly influence normative transitions) through the analysis of the impact of values or of social identities on transitions considered as dependent variables (Cinnirella, 1998) . Furthermore, acknowledging the role of the social environment and the individual behavior on cognitive transitions requires that the disciplines interact and provide complementary contributions to the study of the life course. In this regard, Doise & Mugny (1997) illustrate the facilitating role of social interactions and social marking in the resolution of Piagetian tasks.
Indeed, this line of research provides insights into the influence of social dynamics on the transition from one cognitive stage to another, and it also shows how these dynamics can be studied with an interdisciplinary approach. Another possible link between social psychology, sociology and social demography is their common interest as to how transitions are regulated by normative representations as well as by life experiences and their interpretation on the one cohabiting couples married more often. According to Manting, the role of cohabitation evolved from a substitute to marriage to a preliminary period before marriage.
Social psychology insists on the singularity of events. This is achieved by assuming that a person defines an event and then by focusing the research on the possible disturbance brought about by the event on the individual identity. The event represents a mark between a "before"
and an "after." Because the event is defined by the individual (or the group), social psychology insists on its subjective character. For example, the concept of attribution captures the idea that various degrees of causal relations could be established between behaviors and "reinforcements" (e.g., the interpretation of an event as positive or negative; Deschamps & Beauvois, 1996) . Attribution leads to the notion of allocation (i.e., how persons can explain events in their everyday life). Here, a distinction is made between "internal and external causalities."
Internal causality means that an individual attributes the event to him-or herself, external causality that he or she names an external, environmental cause for the event. The current hypothesis is that the type of attribution performed by the individuals has major consequences on their future behaviors.
Sociology and social demography have a certain extent of common ground as far as the definition of events is concerned, especially of events perceived by the individuals as intrinsically motivated (e.g. marriage). Furthermore, sociology also insists on the expectedness of the event (normative life events vs. stressful events). In the case of stressful events, the interest lies especially on their "consequences" for the life courses.
In cognitive psychology, the event is mainly apprehended as a stimulus or a novel phenomenon or a disturbance the individual has to react to, and is thus usually defined by the experimenter (i.e., simulated and manipulated as an independent variable). Typically, the research is not interested in the event itself, but in the individual reaction to the event understood as a stimulus.
The meaning of the term "disturbing event" is sometimes only slightly different in each discipline. In social demography, the succession of events is addressed by most researchers. The questions circle around the effects of a perturbing event on the occurrence of other events (e.g., the effect of migration on marriage; Courgeau & Lelièvre, 1989) . In this perspective, disturbing events are similar to the "turning points" in social psychology or sociology. These events coincide with trajectory changes ("bifurcation" as described in sociology by de Co-
ninck & Godard, 1989 is a closely related concept). An example of a turning point (or event)
is a disabling illness or accident and its eventual consequences in the form of a deep and global reorientation of life. Events occurring in a "coherent" way within the overall orientation of a trajectory can be opposed to turning points. In sociology and social psychology, disturbing events are unexpected and often considered as "stressful", at least potentially. These events can be directly related to persons (e.g., illness) or to external events (e.g., death of a significant relative, parents' divorce, collective dismissal). In this last case, the interest lies in the amount of stress caused by the event depending on its social context and meaning.
In the present context, a special mention should be made of the research field of life event research (Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, 1982; Brown & Harris, 1989) , an area of study that rests on the basic hypothesis that unforeseen events in the life course can alter its further progress and have more or less important consequences on the persons who experience them. It is multidisciplinary since at least social psychiatry, social psychology and sociology are being mobilized by life-event researchers, and it represents one extreme, "empiricist" option of interdisciplinarity in that it is often practiced with particularly little theoretical preconceptions, at least concerning the nature of significant events and of the mechanisms that relate them to their possible effects on the life course. Even though it seems to be rarely integrated by more outspokenly life-course or life-span oriented research, some results of this line of research confirm basic tenets of life-course research precisely because of its atheoretical conception, such as the finding that the positive or negative value of life events cannot be found in themselves, but depend strongly on their interpretation by the concerned actors and their environment, that their positive or negative effects depend moreover on the coping resources concerned actors can mobilize, and that the abruptness of their occurrence may be as consequential as their qualitative noxiousness (which reminds one of Durkheim's notion of "happy crises" that may create, according to his hypothesis, as much anomy as unhappy ones).
A disturbing or stressful event may act as a turning point. In a rigorous conceptual perspective, we may even ask whether the notion of event should be located on the same level as the other three terms, trajectory, stage, and transition. We might also consider events to be potential transitions (of positive or negative social value) depending on the possibilities of lifecourse actors to cope with them. Finally, what is an event may vary as a function of the finegrainedness we chose for our interrogation: divorce can be considered as en event, unique and momentary, e.g., in a demographic analysis. But it can as well be studied as a rather long-term process in which the formal act of legalized separation is only one relatively late step, and maybe not even the most consequential one.
Transversal substantive themes -contents of this volume
A third line of interdisciplinary collaboration can be found in transversal themes or research dimensions that appear in several disciplines, even though they are typically approached differently by them. In a way, the formal aspects treated in the previous section -especially transitions and events -have also very substantive meanings; they can therefore also be subsumed under this heading and may be considered as first examples. Examples of other such dimensions are, in an arbitrary and imperfect order, gender differentiation, subjective vs. objective aspects of the life course and their relationships (« subjective » including questions of experience, representations, identity, projects, cultural models, etc.), agency vs. structure in and about life courses, linked lives, interinstitutional links forming life-course regimes. We may also think of thematic fields such as gerontology, which, by definition, is inter-or at least multidisciplinary. Various academic departments (especially human development and family studies) as well as centers of gerontology typically count among their members scholars from different disciplines, such as demography, sociology, psychology, biology, kinesiology, nurse practice, health policy, communication science, social work, educational sciences, ecology, counseling, anthropology, philosophy, theology, etc. 16 It is, however, certainly not sufficient to have different disciplines attached to the same organizational unit for interdisciplinarity to develop, even if this can become a favorable condition. Direct collaboration is a much more promising situation, especially in projects explicitly designed to be interdisciplinary from the outset.
We have chosen to organize this volume around four such themes: agency and structure, transitions, biographical re-construction, and methodological innovations. The first three themes are substantive and take up some of the transversal lines we have sketched earlier in this essay. The disciplinary origins of their authors reflect that they are not yet equally treated in the disciplines we solicited for this volume.
Agency and structure
Agency and structure has become an important issue in sociological debates since the 80s, perhaps less so in other disciplines. The first chapter takes up this theme, locating it clearly in the substantive area of life-course research.
Settersten and Gannon focus on the joint impact of social structure and human agency, in proposing a life-course model of agency within structure. They consider how individuals actively create their own lives and maximize their own development within parameters set by their social worlds (some of which may constrain them, and some of which may enable them), and how individuals interact with, and even make proactive attempts to alter, those worlds.
Several examples from three different life periods are provided: childhood and adolescence, early adulthood through midlife, and old age. The tension between the theses of standardization or de-standardization of life courses is reconceptualized as not to be resolved by one thesis winning out over the other, but as being acknowledged to be complementary processes, loosely associated with agentic and structural dimensions of the life course.
Marshall tackles the topic of structure and agency first by reviewing the literature for explicit and implicit definitions of these two crucial terms and by revisiting, in an autobiographic return, some earlier results of his comparative study of aging communities. He comes up with a theoretical model containing both aspects and recovers Clausen's concept of planful competence as one straightforward way to conceptualize life-course agency. Like other contributors, he reminds us of important complexity that must not go unnoticed in life-course research, especially a necessary differentiation of the concept of identity, and expresses hope for a rejuvenating theoretical input by European life-course researchers.
Lüscher looks into a specific and often neglected aspect of social relations, especially intergenerational relations, tending to rehabilitate ambivalence as a basic psychological ingredient for sociological analysis. This is a timely hint at the fact that the links between the lives lifecourse analysis is bound to take into account are not just arrows on network charts, but real social relations with their affective depth and complexity. In fact, the concept of linked lives is extremely important, but still awaits theoretical and empirical development, not only con- 
Biographical Re-construction
Life-course and biographical analysis (in the sociological, not the demographic use of the term as we pointed out before) have long been considered to be strangers ignoring each other -if not hostile antagonists -especially in some European research traditions. Heirs of the fundamental debate between the « two cultures » in the social sciences, life-course analysis is often purported to be positivist, explanatory and quantitative, biographical analysis constructivist, interpretive, and qualitative. While this divide still exists, it has become questioned by more recent pragmatic positions, preferring mixed methodologies (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998 ) and quali-quanti triangulation (Erzberger & Prein, 1997) to methodological fundamentalism. Even though this debate has probably raged more in sociology than in most other social science disciplines, it is highly relevant for all of them, especially in the life-course area.
The contributions concerning biographical reconstruction are instructive in this respect, the first relating identity change directly to life-course transitions, the second approaches directly and empirically the crucial theme of biographical memorization, and the third is an example of interpretive work in a discipline that has heretofore privileged quantitative approaches.
Biographical accounts have become a field more currently shared at least by social psychologists and sociologists. Finally, in their afterthought chapter, the editors bundle together the novel impulses for fostering interdisciplinary life-course research that can be gleaned from the contributions to this volume and suggest directions for future development.
